The results in this paper, using a structural multi-country macroeconometric model, suggest that there is at most a small gain from fiscal stimulus in the form of increased transfer payments or increased tax deductions if the increased debt generated must eventually be paid back. The gain in output and employment on the way up is roughly offset by the loss in output and employment on the way down as the debt from the initial stimulus is paid off. This conclusion is robust to different assumptions about monetary policy. To the extent that there is a gain, the longer one waits to begin paying the debt back the better.
The MC model has positive government spending multipliers, and so one might think that the answer to the question posed in this paper is obviously yes. It will be seen, however, that there is very little gain, if any, from an increase in transfer payments if the increased spending must eventually be paid for. The gain in output and employment on the way up is roughly offset by the loss in output and employment on the way down as the debt from the initial stimulus is paid off.
A property of the MC model-see Fair (2005) -is that monetary policy is not powerful enough to stabilize the economy. If it were, then full employment could always be achieved through monetary policy and there would be no need for fiscal stimulus. In the experiments below different assumptions about monetary policy are used, and it will be seen that the results are not sensitive to the different assumptions.
The use of transfer payments as the government spending variable covers many tax policies as well. Many tax changes are changes in what are sometimes called "tax expenditures"-changing loopholes, deductions, etc.-rather than changes in tax rates. Changes like these are essentially changes in transfer payments. Also, federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments can be considered transfer payments to the extent that state and local governments in turn transfer the money to households. The experiments in this paper thus encompass a fairly wide range of policy variables. This paper does not, however, consider government purchases of goods and services, which may have investment components. If government spending on, say, transportation pays for itself in the future through increased government revenue of various forms, there is no increase in the long run debt and so no need to reverse anything in the future.
An experiment consists of increasing transfer payments from a baseline run for 8 quarters, then either decreasing them immediately for 8 quarters or waiting 16 quarters and decreasing them for 8 quarters. The decreases are chosen to get the debt/GDP ratio back to baseline by 56 quarters after the initial quarter of the increase. The horizon is thus 14 years. Within this horizon, using a discount rate of 2 percent (versus zero) makes little difference to the conclusions, as will be seen. Discounting would, of course, make a difference if one waited, say, 30 or 40 years before contracting. Waiting this long is close to just never paying the debt back. This paper is concerned with the case in which the debt must be paid back in a shorter amount of time.
Previous Literature
Ramey (2011) reviews the literature on estimating the size of the government spending multiplier, where government spending is purchases of goods (not transfer payments) and there are no spending decreases or tax increases later. She concludes that the multiplier is probably between 0.8 and 1.5, although the range is considerably higher than this. The models have rational expectations, and so everyone knows that the initial increase in debt will be paid off eventually. The experiments are run under various 1 Barro and Redlick (2011) also estimate a tax multiplier. assumptions about monetary accommodation. The experiments with these models differ from those reported above in that the debt/GDP ratio is forced back to the baseline (the steady state) in the long run. One might think that the fiscal multipliers would be small in these models because agents know that the extra spending will eventually be paid for. In fact, the short-run multipliers are fairly large in most cases and the sums of the output gaps over the entire period are generally positive. The general features of the DSGE models that lead to the above conclusion are the following. A government spending shock (or decrease in taxes) stimulates liquidity-constrained households to consume more. Given this increased demand, firms that are allowed to change their prices raise them, but firms that are not allowed to change their prices are committed to sell all that is demanded at their current (unchanged) prices. The overall price level goes up, but there is also an output effect. All this happens even though agents in the model know that the increased government debt will eventually be paid back through lower future government spending or higher taxes. The initial (essentially constrained) output effect dominates. It is also the case that the mark-up falls for those firms that cannot change their prices. The increased inflation that is generated may lead the monetary authority to raise the interest rate, and so the results are sensitive to what is assumed about monetary policy.
There is finally a recent paper by DeLong and Summers (2012), which argues that there may be times in which fiscal expansions are self-financing-no long run increase in the debt/GDP ratio. There are no estimated equations in this paper, no lagged effects of government spending on output, and some calibrated parameters that seem unrealistic or for which there is little empirical support. For example, the marginal tax-and-transfer rate is taken to be 0.33, which seems too high. In 2011 the ratio of federal government tax receipts (including social security taxes) and unemployment benefits to GDP was 0.17. This is an average rate and the marginal rate may be higher, but 37 percent of tax receipts are social security taxes, where the tax rate is flat and then zero at some income level. There is also a key hysteresis parameter in the model, also calibrated, which reflects the assumption that potential output depends on current output in depressed states of the economy. If current fiscal stimulus increases future potential output, there is obviously some effect large enough to generate enough extra future government revenue to pay for the stimulus.
The MC model uses the methodology of structural macroeconometric modeling, sometimes called the "Cowles Commission approach," which goes back at least to Tinbergen (1939) . I contrast this methodology with that of DSGE models in Fair (2012) , and this discussion will not be repeated here. The main arguments against the DSGE methodology are that the models tend to be heavily calibrated, leave out many features of the economy, use theory in a highly restrictive way, and are based on the assumption of rational expectations, which may not be realistic.
The MC model is much more empirically based than are the DSGE models, but the model is not just a series of ad hoc regressions. In the theory behind the model households maximize expected utility and firms maximize expected profits. The theory is used to choose left hand side and right hand side variables in the equations to be estimated. The estimated equations are taken to be approximations to the decision equations of agents. The theory leads to many exclusion restrictions in the estimated equations, and lack of identification is not an issue. Expectations are assumed to be adaptive, and under this assumption the Lucas critique is not an issue. There are also important physical stock effects in the model. There are four physical stock variables: durables, housing, capital, and inventories. Lagged one period, the stock of durables has a negative effect on durable expenditures, the stock of housing has a negative effect on housing investment, the stock of capital has a negative effect on plant and equipment investment, and the stock of inventories has a negative effect on inventory investment. These stock effects mitigate recessions and tame booms. As physical stocks get low in a recession, there is, other things being equal, an increased demand to replenish them, which helps counteract the recession. The opposite happens in a boom. All these stock effects are estimatedagain no calibration. Another way of looking at these stock effects is that the model has built in cyclical features. As, say, stimulus measures expand the economy and stocks are built up, forces are at work that will slow the economy later.
The MC Model
The production function in the model is assumed to be one of fixed proportions in the short run. Actual labor productivity is output divided by labor hours, and potential labor productivity is taken to equal actual labor productivity at the peaks of the actual series. Potential labor productivity is then linearly interpolated between the peaks. A similar procedure is followed for capital productivity. This allows measures of excess labor and excess capital to be computed, where at the peaks the measures are zero. The peak-to-peak interpolations are taken to be exogenous, and so potential output is exogenous. The amount of excess labor on hand has a negative effect on labor demand, and the amount of excess capital on hand has a negative effect on investment.
ROW Model
The ROW model consists of estimated equations for 37 countries. There are up to 13 estimated equations per country and 16 identities. There are a total of 279 estimated equations in the ROW model. The estimated equations explain total imports, consumption, fixed investment, inventory investment, the domestic price level, the demand for money, a short term interest rate, a long term interest rate, the spot exchange rate, the forward exchange rate, the export price level, employment, and the labor force. The specifications are similar across countries. The short term interest rate for each country is explained by an estimated interest rate rule for that country. In some cases the U.S. interest rate is an explanatory variable in the one country leads to increases in other countries' import prices, which affects their domestic and thus export prices, which feeds back to the original country, etc.
Exogenous Variables and Asset-Price Variables
Since monetary policy is endogenous because of the interest rate rules, the main exogenous variables in the model are demographic variables, fiscal-policy variables, and some asset-price variables. One set of asset-price variables consists of the export prices of the oil-exporting countries (roughly the price of oil). Oil prices are essentially unpredictable, and they have been taken to be exogenous.
Another asset-price variable in the US model is the price of housing relative to the GDP deflator. This ratio is also taken to be exogenous. 
Transfer Payment Multipliers
To get an idea of the properties of the MC model, 
The Experiments
The results in this paper are based on actual data through 2012:1 (data available as For experiment "NOWAIT" the decreases begin in the ninth quarter, where as a percentage of potential output they are per quarter 0.5λ, 1.0λ, 1.5λ, 2.0λ, 2.0λ, 2.0λ, 2.0λ, and 2.0λ. λ is chosen to be the smallest value that results in the debt/GDP ratio returning to its baseline value sometime before the end of the 56-quarter period. 
Results
Summary results are presented in Tables 2, 3 , and 4 for the three periods. The experiments using the interest rate rule are presented first in each table except   for Table 4 , where the rule is not used. The first experiment of each set of three experiments is the case where there is no future de-stimulus, denoted "NOPAY." NOPAY is always stimulative. For example, in Table 3 Turning to the cases where there is de-stimulus, it is always true that WAIT is more stimulative than NOWAIT. Loosely speaking, by waiting four years before de-stimulating, the economy has time to build on the initial stimulus, which lessens the cost of getting the debt/GDP ratio back to baseline. In fact, except for NOWAIT, NORULE in Table 2 , NOWAIT is never stimulative. The sums are negative or close to zero, even when discounting. The sums for WAIT, while positive, are very small in Tables 3 and 4 . Only in Table 2 would one say that the effort might be worth it.
In Table 2 the output sum for WAIT, RULE is $58.9 billion, compared to $168.3 billion in the NOPAY, RULE case. The MC model is nonlinear, and this is the main reason for the differences across tables.
Comparing WAIT, RULE with WAIT, NORULE, NORULE is slightly more stimulative. When RULE is in effect, the Fed increases interest rates as the stimulus is taking place, which, among other things, increases federal interest payments and thus the federal debt. Six years after the beginning of the stimulus the debt is larger than it otherwise would be because of the increased interest rates. It thus takes a little more work to get the debt/GDP ratio back to baseline than it would if interest rates never increased (from baseline), as in the NORULE case. In the RULE case interest rates do fall during the de-stimulus, which helps lower interest payments, but the net effect is for slightly more overall expansion in the NORULE case.
None of the conclusions are changed by discounting. If anything, the argument against stimulating may be a little stronger with discounting. As discussed in Section 3, there are endogenous cycles in the MC model because of physical stock effects. This means that after de-stimulus has taken place (five to nine years out) physical stocks are sometimes lower than baseline, which, other things being equal, leads to increased investment in the future. So for the last few years of the 14-year period, the output gaps can be positive. If these gaps are discounted, the overall gain from the experiment is thus smaller than if they are not discounted, other things being equal.
The long run effects on the GDP deflator are always small, as would be expected
given that the sums of the output deviations are small. λ, which measures the size of the de-stimulus needed to get the debt/GDP ratio back to baseline, is larger, with one exception, for NOWAIT versus WAIT. It is also larger for RULE versus NORULE (with one tie). The range is from 0.65 to 1.05.
The MC model consists of hundreds of endogenous variables, many for other countries, and the results for any of these variables can be examined on the author's website. No further detail will be given here except for Table 5 . Table 5 gives more detailed results for the WAIT, RULE experiment in Table 3 . The values in Table   5 are deviations from baseline for each of the 56 quarters. The first column is for real transfer payments, which is the exogenous spending variable. The remaining variables are endogenous. Two physical stock variables are presented, excess capital (EXK) and the housing stock (KH), to give a sense of the physical 
Caveats
Models in the Cowles Commission tradition, which the MC model is, are sometimes called "Keynesian" models (and sometimes "old fashioned Keynesian" or worse). It may thus be surprising that a model in this tradition suggests that fiscal stimulus is not very effective. Keynes famous (infamous?) statement that "in the long run we are all dead" is consistent with ignoring any increases in the debt/GDP ratio that may result from fiscal stimulus, in which case stimulus is effective. The relevant statement for the present experiments, on the other hand, is "in the long run the debt must be paid off," admittedly not quite as catchy.
A key question when considering a fiscal stimulus is thus whether the long run can be ignored. In periods of low debt/GDP ratios, like much of the post war period until about 2008, permanently raising the debt/GDP ratio may not have been much of a worry. At the present time (2012), however, the debt/GDP ratio is high and rising, and it is a worry to many people. One concern is that at some (unpredictable) time there will be negative asset market reactions. For example, extending at the end of 2011 the payroll tax cuts and increased unemployment benefits through 2012 with no plan to pay down the increased debt in the future likely increased the chance of negative market reactions in the future.
Given the constraint that any stimulus must eventually be paid for, why might the conclusion that there is little gain from fiscal stimulus be wrong? Regarding monetary policy, it has modest effects in the MC model, as noted in Section 3. The policy of NORULE, which is the accommodating policy, gives slightly better results than RULE, but the differences are not large. If the model is wrong and monetary policy is powerful enough to keep the economy at full employment, then fiscal stimulus is unnecessary, making the question posed in this paper uninteresting.
The conclusion could be sensitive to the treatment of potential output, which, as discussed in Section 3, is taken to be exogenous in the model. If, as in the DeLong and Summers (2012) story, potential output is positively affected by stimulus measures, this would increase the case for fiscal stimulus. The main possibility in the model would be a permanent increase in long run labor or capital productivity (upward shifts of the peak-to-peak interpolations). This effect is hard to estimate and probably second order, but it has been ignored here. Remember that the fiscal stimulus tool in this paper is the level of transfer payments or tax expenditures.
The conclusion does not pertain to government purchases of goods and services, which in many cases are partly investment and may have positive rates of return.
As discussed in Section 3, the changes in asset prices in the model are either exogenous or only slightly affected by the economy. A stimulus, for example, does not lead to large changes in stock prices. In the model stock prices rise modestly (relative to baseline) during the stimulus and fall modestly during the de-stimulus.
If it is the case that a stimulus leads to large and permanent increases in asset prices, which would in the model have positive effects on consumption and investment, the economy could grow fast enough to lead to only a small increase in the debt/GDP ratio, which could be paid off with a small de-stimulus. Since changes in asset prices are roughly random walks with drift, it is unlikely that effects of stimulus measures on asset prices could be estimated. Finally, a general criticism of the present results is that the MC model is so badly misspecified that none of the estimates are trustworthy. A different conclusion is reached using the DSGE models in Coenen et al.(2012) , and one might trust these models more. As discussed in Section 2, the MC model is more empirically based than are DSGE models, which tend to be heavily calibrated. The key property of DSGE models, namely that there are gains to short run fiscal stimulus, relies on price-setting restrictions, usually Calvo pricing, liquidity-constrained households, and rational expectations, all of which have limited empirical backing. The MC model is more empirically grounded and thus possibly more trustworthy. But at a minimum the use of a model in the Cowles Commission tradition provides an alternative way of estimating the effects of fiscal stimulus-a reality check if you will on DSGE results.
Conclusion
The results in this paper suggest that there is at most a small gain from fiscal stimulus in the form of increased transfer payments or increased tax deductions if the increased debt generated must eventually be paid back. This conclusion is robust to different assumptions about monetary policy. To the extent that there is a gain, the longer one waits to begin paying the debt back the better.
Possible caveats regarding the model used are that 1) monetary policy is not powerful enough to keep the economy at full employment, 2) potential output is taken to be exogenous, 3) any permanent effects on asset prices and animal spirits from a stimulus are not taken into account, and 4) the model does not have the feature that in really bad times the economy might collapse without a stimulus.
